Spy agents: Evaluating trust in remote environments by Kalogridis, Georgios et al.
Spy Agents: Evaluating Trust in Remote Environments
Georgios Kalogridis∗, Chris J. Mitchell†, and Gary Clemo∗
∗Toshiba Research Europe Limited
Telecommunications Research Laboratory, 32 Queen Square, Bristol, BS1 4ND, UK
E-mail: {georgios.kalogridis, gary.clemo}@toshiba-trel.com
†Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK
E-mail: c.mitchell@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract— We introduce the notion of spy agents
and describe how they can be deployed within diverse
network protocol architectures in order to perform high
fidelity trust assessments in remote environments. The
spy agent framework developed here consists of: a
spy agent structural architecture that instruments and
instantiates spy agents with appropriate content; a spy
agent routing framework that fabricates and deploys
the overall spying scenario with specialised spying
routing protocols; and an evaluation entity that imple-
ments all the necessary security analysis mechanisms.
Keywords—Spy agents, trust evaluation, surveillance
1. Introduction
Mobile agents are the basis of a distributed
programming infrastructure with numerous inher-
ent potentially beneficial characteristics such as
autonomy, flexibility and intelligence [1]. One
typical example of an application is a price com-
parison agent which “visits” a number of on-line
retailer sites or nodes and requests a price for
a particular item. The agent could retrieve and
process information, including for example prices,
from a number of different retailers.
However, there are still challenges that need
to be addressed, including mobile agent security
[2]. As is widely discussed (see, for example, [2],
[3]) there are two parallel sets of security issues
associated with mobile agents, namely protecting
hosts (and other agents) against malicious agents,
and protecting agents against malicious hosts.
Legitimate mobile agents will interact with
hosts in a defined way, and hosts will be built to
deal with expected agent behaviour. This contrasts
with viruses and other “illegitimate” agents, which
may attempt to access the host itself rather than
remain in the execution environment reserved for
agents (e.g. a sandbox). Such malicious agents can
then steal sensitive information from the host, for
example personal financial details, cause the host
to act in an unintended way, for example send
spam emails, or simply corrupt the host so that it
no longer functions properly.
The parallel security problem, and the one that
is the main focus of this paper, is that agents are
at the mercy of the host which executes them,
as ultimately the host may either carry out the
functions requested by the agent as expected, or
it may manipulate the agent. Such manipulation
might include reading data contained within the
agent which is intended to remain private, e.g.
the source address or the identity of the agent
originator. This information can then be misused
for a variety of purposes, including forwarding
spam to the originator’s email address. Other ex-
amples of inappropriate behaviour might include
reading quotes from competitor on-line retailers
and providing a more attractive quote, or changing
the other quotes to make them less attractive.
Autonomous mobile agents, apart from obtain-
ing price quotes or retrieving other information
for further analysis, might also be able to per-
form a transaction remotely and completely au-
tonomously based on the client’s instructions. For
example, to get a cheap air ticket automatically,
an agent might be instructed to visit several on-
line stores in order to make a purchase. The client
may wish to give third parties certain personal
information, embedded in the agent, only if there
is a considerable discount on the final price. The
host should never read or modify the agent’s
transaction logic, or the private data that the agent
will carry; however there is clearly a possibility
for such abuse.
In this paper we address this latter security
issue, i.e. the threat posed by malicious hosts. We
introduce a new kind of security service designed
to indirectly improve the overall security level
by means of accurate and powerful evaluation
mechanisms that pre-emptively assess the security
of remote hosts, before they are sent vulnerable
mobile agents. We introduce the notion of spy
agents as “legitimate” mobile agents which are
able to interact with remote, potentially hostile,
mobile agent platforms in a manner that facilitates
trust assessment.
We further introduce a spy agent framework,
and we analyse the importance and the value that
this could have in a number of situations.
2. Background
Surveys of mobile agent security issues can be
found in [2], [3]. The two main actors in a mobile
agent system are the following:
• Agent: An instance of mobile code
• Host: A platform that can execute agents
As mentioned in the introduction, in this pa-
per we consider the threat posed to agents by
malicious hosts; this is an important research
area and a plethora of solutions have been pro-
posed (tamper-proof hardware [4], tamper-proof
execution environment [5], code obfuscation [6],
encrypted functions [7], [8], strategic division of
functionality across multiple agents [9], etc). Nev-
ertheless, none of the existing solutions is able to
address the problem in both a practical and robust
manner, because they either depend on hardware
modules, or have unresolved technical problems,
and/or depend too much on trust assumptions and
implied policies.
Instead of trying to overcome these issues with
some direct security mechanisms, we propose a
robust trust evaluation mechanism that can indi-
rectly provide mobile agents with the required
security. This can be leveraged by special mobile
agents that will bear security services enabling
them to retrieve and process security related in-
formation from target hosts. This concept is in-
troduced in [10], which suggests that a security
assessment can be facilitated simply when an
agent migrates from a trusted platform to a target
platform, where it gets certain information and
then returns to the trusted host for further analysis.
Ideas relevant to the notion of spy agents can be
found in the field of internet security monitoring
services. Strategically placed control mechanisms
can perform service monitoring, [11], [12], in-
cluding monitoring of enhanced IP services and
virtual private network (VPN) packets. Similarly,
in distributed intrusion detection systems, [13],
[14], control agents may protect a domain by
“interrogating” suspicious agents.
3. The challenge
The idea of a distributed security system com-
prising security agents patrolling target entities,
modelling and monitoring behaviours and poten-
tially taking steps in advance, is not novel. How-
ever, in previous approaches [11]–[13], [15] the
idea is that such security mechanisms or agents
operate in trusted environments and cannot be
applied in remote, potentially hostile, areas.
In [10] the authors attempt to approach the chal-
lenge of remote trust evaluation; however there
are major limitations in their approach. The main
problem is that it is assumed that the target hosts
will adhere to their policies and will provide the
agents with all the security assessment informa-
tion they request. Hence, a potentially corrupted
remote host could serve these security agents by
providing them with apparently proper informa-
tion. The host could subsequently not behave in
an appropriate manner when it has the opportunity
to cheat without being detected and, vice versa,
in order to escape detection, it may modify its
behaviour if it knows it is being monitored.
By contrast with previous work, our proposed
spy agents are designed to be able to fetch se-
curity information that truly reflects the genuine
character of any remote host.
4. The spy agent concept
The main idea behind a spy agent is that it
provides the means to evaluate trust in remote en-
vironments without the target hosts knowing that
they are being assessed. In this way, spy agents
have the ability to determine the target hosts’
genuine behaviour, i.e. the degree to which a host
complies with its policies or, more specifically,
with its responsibility to respect client security
requirements.
A significant part of a spy agent’s task is
the extraction of security-related information from
remote hosts, without violating the remote host’s
policy or security protection mechanisms. This
means that a spy agent should retrieve the infor-
mation it needs from remote hosts in a legitimate
way and with the explicit permission of the host
concerned; at the same time this must happen in a
way that does not reveal the spy agent’s true ob-
jectives. The information retrieved by a spy agent
will not necessarily be directly security-related; it
simply needs to be information that can be used
in some way to assess host behaviour, possibly
when combined with information retrieved by one
or more other such agents.
In all cases target hosts should be unable to
exhibit special behaviour in order to give a good
impression. In brief, the following requirements
spying requirements are identified:
• Target hosts should be incapable of deciding
whether they are dealing with a spying sce-
nario or not;
• Spy agents should appear as “normal” m-
commerce ones;
• Target hosts should be given motives to mis-
behave by using spy agents as “baits”;
• Feedback should be analysed in a safe envi-
ronment.
5. Spy agent system architecture
In general terms a spy agent system dissem-
inates a number of assessment spy agents to a
target network node in an insecure network, and
retrieves these agents following interaction with
the node. As it will be further discussed in section
6, a large number of spy agents can facilitate more
enhanced cross-referenced analyses.
One of the most basic requirements is to pro-
vide spy agents with anonymity. This is achieved
by arranging the agents so that they can be asso-
ciated with different sources or transmitters. That
is, spy agents can be forwarded to a plurality of
trusted nodes in the network, which each modify
the received agent’s code in order to show the
trusted node as the source of the agent, before
forwarding the agent towards the target node. This
is shown in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Fundamental spy agent system
components
For reasons that will be analysed in more detail
below, a spy agent should ideally give away as
little information as possible. In this context it
is proposed that the modified spy agent should
ultimately be destined for a trusted node different
to the node that sends it to the target host. This
second trusted node will be notified by the first
trusted node to expect a particular spy agent, and
on receiving the agent will be able to forward it
back to its origin.
When all spy agents return to their original
source, the spy agent system will then proceed
to analyse their interactions with the target node,
in order to determine a trust level for it.
5.1 Spy agent content framework
A schematic of a software spy agent is shown
in figure 2. The agent includes an agent ID as well
as an origin or source ID field, a final destination
ID field, a number of intermediate node IDs, and a
payload. The payload includes personal data such
as a name, address, email address, various certifi-
cates, financial information, and other information
associated with a person or client. Finally, the
agent includes executable code.
The spy agent’s private data, such as ID in-
formation, email address, public key certificates,
and so on, should preferably correspond to a
temporary entity that a mobile platform sets up in
a legitimate manner. Hence they should represent
a virtual client that appears to be a normal client,
and its relationship with the real client are hidden
by the system. In this way it can be ensured that
the target hosts behave in exactly the same way
as they would behave to a real e-commerce agent
scenario. In order to be able to disguise a spy
agent in this way, the spying system needs to
interact and cooperate in a secure manner with on-
line services such as e-mail providers, certification
authorities and banks, who need to be aware of
the purposes of the spy agent and be prepared to
support them. These relationships are shown in
Figure 3.
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Figure 2: Spy agent internal structure
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Figure 3: Spy agent system architecture for
collaboration with other trusted parties
For example, the creator of an assessment agent
might want to set up a temporary email address, or
request a certificate from a certification authority
for temporary use in assessing a host. This certifi-
cate need not allow an agent to perform any trans-
action automatically since it will be temporary.
However the target platforms will not be aware
of this, and should believe that the agent will be
equipped with all the “normal” functions of an m-
commerce agent. That is, it must appear to be just
another commerce agent that could, if it wishes,
decide to complete a transaction.
Overall the preferred structure of a spy agent
should be the most commonly used such scheme.
Apart from supporting interoperability, the spy
agent will also look “normal” and “common” and
this minimises the probability of making target
hosts suspicious. This satisfies the overall security
objective behind the spy agent concept.
5.2 Spy agent routing framework
One of the most important aspects of the spy
agent system is the routing mechanism that deter-
mines the specifics of the spy agents’ distribution
logic and influences the content of each agent,
as described in the previous paragraph. The need
for a routing logic arises from the complexity of
dealing with multiple agents, issued from a large
number of trusted nodes, and being routed over
different paths. This becomes necessity since the
kind of information exchanged between all the
spy agents and an arbitrary target node, including
routing information, can determine how well the
spy agent requirements, outlined above, are met.
The routing scheme should effectively disguise the
fact that spy agents originate from a specific client
device and are in any way related.
A migration path is the chain of all the plat-
forms that an agent visits during its life (start-
ing from a trusted platform). Thus all migra-
tion information included in an assessment spy
agent, should not contain (or should minimise the)
common elements between peer spy agents that
reach the same target platform. This minimises the
likelihood of a target platform linking the two spy
agents and becoming aware of the spying scenario.
Note that the trusted platforms could, for example,
be the same mobile terminal, a home computer, or,
preferably, random public servers set up for that
purpose (this might come at an increased network
and end user cost).
Ideally, not making the target hosts suspicious
requires that all the information that target hosts
retrieve from spy agents is completely uncorre-
lated. In order to achieve this it is necessary
to know the nature of all the inter-relationships
between those target hosts that at least one of the
spies is going to visit. For example, a typical case
is where it can be assumed that all target hosts
are uncorrelated, and do not share any information
or cross-reference intelligence information. In this
case an efficient spy agent routing design requires
any two spies to be uncorrelated, only if these two
spies eventually visit one common target host. If
these two spies do not have a common target host
in their migration logic, then it is unnecessary to
try to design them to appear to be uncorrelated.
Additionally, it is proposed that the assessment
agents should be designed to route themselves
through two or more target hosts rather than just
one. Otherwise, if a target host receives an agent
that insists on migrating to an unknown server
(without migrating, for example, to a known com-
petitor), it will have a good reason to refrain from
behaving badly (either because it believes that
this incoming agent might be an assessment agent
or because it cannot see any direct competition).
Thus a normally misbehaving server or target
platform might behave correctly (just in case),
and subsequently the evaluation results will not
meet the system objectives. This is because the
server may not react similarly when, for example,
the incoming agent requests to migrate to a well-
known rival service provider. Moreover, the mo-
bile device will not be able to repeat assessment
procedures because the host may assess these
incoming agents as probably being spy agents,
assuming that it keeps records of past events and
makes statistical analyses and comparisons.
Some of the discussed routing strategy princi-
ples are demonstrated in the example spying rout-
ing scenario shown in Figure 4. In this example,
a mobile device evaluates three target platforms.
The mobile device uses three trusted platforms
in order to set up its distributed routing strategy,
as well as maintain its anonymity. The device
instantiates six mobile agents, separated into two
matching groups of three:
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SP3'
Target platform 3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Figure 4: Testing three target platforms with the
aid of three trusted platforms and six spy agents
• The first three spies start their journey from
a single trusted platform and then migrate to
two target platforms in turn. The spy agents
do not contain any logic dictating where they
should migrate after visiting a second target
platform.
• The three spies in the second group, which
are called guidance spy agents and are in
one-to-one correspondence with the spies in
the first group, contain migration informa-
tion for the corresponding agents of the first
group. They visit the platform where the
corresponding spy is waiting to be instructed
where to go next. With this technique the spy
agent’s anonymity can be further enhanced.
In this scenario it is suggested that two
agents executing in a remote host may inter-
communicate. It is assumed that this is al-
lowed only between two mobile agents that have
been instructed to do so. Hence, agent inter-
communication will only be allowed between a
spy agent and its respective guidance spy agent.
It is suggested that mobile agents may employ
cryptographic techniques that will thwart a po-
tential security breach of this requirement. For
example standard cryptographic protocols can be
used for mutual authentication and integrity (see
for example, Boyd and Mathuria [16]).
In more detail, the first spy agent, SP1, (see
Figure 4) leaves from the first trusted platform,
TrP1, visits the first target platform, TaP1, mi-
grates to TaP3, and waits to meet the first guid-
ance spy agent, SP1′, coming from TrP2. Sim-
ilarly SP2 starts from TrP2, migrates to TaP2,
then TaP1, and waits for further instructions
from SP2′ coming from TrP3. In a symmetrical
fashion, SP3 waits in TaP2 for guidance. Finally,
SP1 is instructed to return to TrP2, SP2 to
return to TrP3, and SP3 to return to TrP1.
Examining TaP1, it can be noted that it hosts
SP1, SP2 and SP2′. Hence, TaP1 is able to
retrieve the following information regarding the
migration paths for SP1, SP2 and SP2′:
• SP1 : (TrP1, TaP1, TaP3)
• SP2 : (TrP2, TaP2, TaP1, T rP3)
• SP2′ : (TrP3, TaP1, T rP3)
It is clear that TaP1 cannot correlate the rout-
ing behaviour of SP1 and SP2, since the only
common element in their routes is itself, TaP1.
It can observe that the routes of SP2 and SP2′
share TrP3, but this does not look suspicious
since SP2 is expecting guidance from SP2′. In a
symmetrical fashion, possible routing correlations
for TaP2 and TaP3 lead to similar conclusions.
Hence it is argued that this routing design satisfies
the basic spying requirements.
An obvious potential weakness of this rout-
ing design is the fact that all target platforms
could learn about the spying scenario if they ex-
changed information. However, this weakness can
be avoided by employing more trusted platforms
and designing the routes for each agent in such a
way that the risk of platform collusion revealing
spy agent behaviour is minimised.
6. Trust evaluation
The final assessment of the trustworthiness of
a target platform could yield estimates for a mul-
titude of security issues, such as the probability
of the host reading or altering private data that
should never be accessed, blocking or diverting
migration, etc.
These assessments could be achieved in a vari-
ety of ways, for example by comparing the data
retrieved by the various agents with that obtained
by agents using different routes. Also the returned
agents could be examined to see if they have
been altered in any way other than in terms of
their retrieved data — this might include blocking
or changing a migration route. For example, the
agents might contain a temporary email address
which can be monitored to determine if spam
emails will be sent in the future. If unsolicited
emails are received at this address, then one of the
hosts visited by the agent containing this address
may be suspected of having violated its policy,
e.g. by reading private data in the agent. Similar
techniques can be implemented in order to provide
a trust level for a number of hosts.
By using multiple agents, the gathered informa-
tion can be cross-referenced, and more accurate
predictions can be made, since each spy agent
visits more than one target host. Hence, if an at-
tack is detected it will be possible to investigate it
and identify a suspect target platform with greater
certainty. On the other hand, if an unmodified
agent is normally returned without delay, then
it can be assumed that with high probability all
visited target platforms have behaved properly.
For example, consider the multiple-agent sce-
nario shown in Figure 4. Assuming that the target
platforms demonstrate their genuine behaviour
and do not modify their behaviour to avoid de-
tection (e.g. if they suspect the purpose of one
or more of the spy agents), then this protocol
architecture enables us to make deductions along
the following lines. Suppose that only SP1 and
SP2 have been tampered with, but not any of
the other four agents. Then since SP1 visited
TaP1 and TaP3 and SP2 visited TaP2 and
TaP1, it seems that TaP1 is more likely to
have misbehaved. Generally it is envisaged that
more detailed and fine-grained conclusions can be
drawn by examining all the spies at the end of
their routes, as long as it is possible to predict
to what degree malicious target platforms can
modify their behaviour to avoid detection.
7. Implementation issues
A spy will attempt to encourage hosts to mis-
behave, in order to obtain the most accurate
assessment of their genuine behaviour. Further-
more, the very existence of assessment agents
will generally mitigate the existence of malicious
service providers, since they will be unable to
distinguish between spy agents and normal e-
commerce agents. Hence, it will not be possible
for them to know if security policies can be
breached without being detected.
Generally, the design requirement to prevent
target hosts from determining whether or not they
are dealing with a spy agent and hence behave
according to their genuine character, contradicts
with the requirement to make more precise assess-
ments about each one of the target platforms. De-
terministic assessments can be made by sending a
number of spy agents to just one target host, but
such a strategy is likely to raise suspicion in the
target host, resulting in atypical (correct) behav-
iour by malicious target hosts. On the other hand,
spy agents that migrate through a large number
of competitors can provide confidence that their
real-life behaviour is exhibited. However, in this
case assessments of any individual host would be
rather uncertain.
It is apparent that the optimum protocol ar-
chitecture should try to balance the pros and
cons in each case and mount the best winning
strategy. However the precise optimal strategy will
be highly variable and will depend on how many
trusted devices a mobile terminal has, what the
computational expenses are in each case, what the
objective of the analysis is (e.g. to maintain high
quality security profiles; to perform an ephemeral
test), when the results are needed (e.g. immedi-
ately or within a fixed time period), how desperate
the terminal is for very accurate results, and how
much it is willing to pay for these results.
8. Conclusions and future work
This paper introduces the concept of spy agents,
justifies the benefits that can be gained from
utilising them, and describes a generic structural
and routing protocol that leverages the idea of
disguising the identity of a spy agent.
The focal point of the proposed framework is
the manner with which spy agents can be coordi-
nated in order to fetch network information, from
which probabilistic conclusions about the security
of a number of network entities can be drawn.
The success of a spying scenario depends on the
amount of cross-referenced retrieved information,
provided that the fundamental spying security
requirements are met. Thus it is proposed to use
a plurality of spy agents and a plurality of trusted
platforms that will coordinate the spy agents’
movements, while hiding the spies’ identities and
the way they are associated.
Spy agent networks could offer a very respon-
sive and reliable security service to end terminals,
the price of which will depend on the reliability of
the service. Assessments of high quality could be
further exploited by other applications in order to
adapt their security to the existing circumstances
as well as control the overall risk in a fine-grained
manner. This methodology is ideal for remote
surveillance and risk assessment.
In future work it is necessary to instrument
metrics, which will quantify how good a specific
routing protocol is, and design mechanisms that
will deploy efficient spying routes for specific
scenarios. Ultimately, it should be possible not
only to evaluate a target host, but also to deter-
mine what will be the exact benefit of utilising
a specific number of resources within a specific
spying scenario, from a security point of view.
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